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In this article, we analyse old-age retirement decisions of Slovenian men and women, eligible 
to retire in the period 1997-2003. In comparison to established market economies, we find 
relatively high hazard rates of retirement that decline with age. This unusual pattern can partly 
be attributed to weak incentives to work, inherent in the design of the pension system and 
reflected in predominantly negative values of accruals, and to transition-specific increase in 
wage inequality in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is reflected in low wages and 
relatively high pensions of less productive (skilled) workers and vice versa. We find that the 
probability of retirement decreases with option value to work and net wages, although the 
response to the former, when controlling for the latter, is rather weak. Our results also imply 
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As in many other countries, the economic sustainability of Slovenia’s social security 
system is under severe pressure owing to ageing caused by a decreasing fertility rate, 
increasing life expectancy and an increasing share of recipients of social benefits (EU 
Commission, 2006). At the same time, Slovenia is a country with employment rates of 
the elderly among the very lowest in EU-27. Namely, according to Eurostat (2010), in 
2009 the employment rates of Slovenian men and women aged 55-64 were only 46.4 
and 24.8 percent, respectively, which is 8.4 and 13.0 percentage points below the EU-27 
averages. An important reason for low employment rates are large outflows of workers 
to retirement. In a short period between 1990 and 1995, the number of persons that 
retired with old-age pensions increased by as much as 31.4 percent, and by the end of 
2000 and 2009 their number further increased by 8.8 and 25.6 percent, respectively, 
raising the share of all retirees in population to 26.5 percent (Eurostat, 2010). 
 To maintain social sustainability, the costs of transition were obviously shifted in 
the 1990s to the pension system through mass early retirement. When the increasingly 
noticeable unfavourable demographic developments were taken into account, it became 
clear that the pension system, implemented with the 1992 Pension and Disability 
Insurance Act (PDIA), would not be able to sustain the pressure (cf. Verbič et al., 2006; 
Verbič, 2007). This became evident in 1996, when the state pension fund needed 
additional financing from the central budget for the first time. This was enough to start 
preparations for the pension reform, which was adopted in the form of the 1999 PDIA 
and implemented starting from 1 January 2000. The pension reform succeeded in 
preventing the employment rates of the elderly from further decreases; however, they 
did not increase either after 2000 (cf. Eurostat, 2010). 
 Slovenia is an example of a country that not only offers weak incentives for 
continued work, similarly to other established market economies (cf. Gruber and Wise, 
2004), but also exhibits particular wage dynamics. It is namely, due to a large output 
decline related to price liberalization (Gomulka, 1992; Kornai, 1994) and aggregate 
demand shocks (Berg and Blanchard, 1994; Rosati, 1994), that the transition countries 
faced a decline in labour demand and consequently a reduction in real wages relative to 
pensions. At the same time wage inequality surged in all transition countries (cf. 
Milanovic, 1999; Mitra and Yemtsov, 2006), an important part of which was attributed 
to increasing returns to education (Orazem and Vodopivec, 1995; 1997; Newell and 
Reilly, 1999; Micklewright, 2000; Campos and Jolliffe, 2003). These shifts in wages, 
combined with early retirement policies, provided weaker incentives for continued work 
for the majority of less educated workers, which are today reflected in the lowest 
employment rates of older workers among the transition countries. 
 Previous pension reform in Slovenia seems to have failed in one of its crucial 
objectives, i.e. to increase the labour force participation of the elderly. In this article we 
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therefore analyze old-age retirement decisions of Slovenian men and women. The key 
questions addressed are: how the design of the pension system affected the aggregate 
flows from employment to retirement; what was the dynamic of hazard rates and 
replacement ratios in Slovenia; how variables such as accrual, social security wealth and 
wages affected labour force participation of the elderly; and what were the crucial 
determinants of retirement probability in transition. For this purpose, we used 
individual-level data for a sample of employed Slovenian workers who were eligible to 
retire with the old-age pension in the 1997-2003 period. 
 Our work contributes to the extensive literature on retirement behaviour, which 
effectively started with the seminal article of Stock and Wise (1990), who suggested 
modelling the retirement decision as a complex financial decision. Unlike preceding 
studies (e.g. Fields and Mitchell, 1984; Hausman and Wise, 1985), which analyzed the 
effects of social security on retirement decisions, they proposed to relate this decision to 
the real option value of work, which reflects the combined incentives of social security 
and labour market performance. Considering such approach as a starting point, Coile 
and Gruber (2001; 2004) proposed a decomposition of option value to work into two 
parts: a part that reflects the social security incentives and a part that reflects the stream 
of future net wages. In our paper, we adopt the latter approach and use the forward-
looking variables as explanatory variables. It is one of the first attempts to measure the 
pension system incentives and relate them to retirement decisions for a transition 
country. While several researchers have already noted that social safety nets in Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have induced workers to inactivity (e.g. Boeri, 
2000; Boeri and Terrell, 2002), data limitations have prevented analysis of individual 
retirement decisions1. 
 In the first part of the empirical analysis, we document the incentive measures that 
reflect both the rules of the pension system and labour market performance. Based on a 
calculation of accruals, we find that the rules on pension determination provide rather 
weak incentives to work in Slovenia. For a large share of individuals in our sample 
additional year of work decreases the expected stream of pensions, i.e. the social 
security wealth, and for individuals with positive value of accrual, the positive effects 
are marginal at best. At the same time low values of accrual imply that the pension 
reform, adopted in 1999, which increased the responsiveness of pensions to lifetime 
incomes and insurance spans, brought only slight improvements to incentives to work. 
 However, the decision to retire is, not driven entirely by the pension system 
incentives. Stock and Wise (1990) show that a rational individual should base her/his 
decision on the option value to work, which encapsulates the combined effects of 
incentives inherent in the design of the pension system and labour market performance. 
We calculated the option values for our sample and found positive values for both men 
                                                 
1
 One exception is the study of Galuščák (2001), who discovered, based on Labour Force Survey data for 
Czech Republic, that the earnings test reduced both the participation and hours of work of the elderly. 
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and women. This result suggests that incentives for work stem mainly from discrepancy 
between the wages and pensions and not from the design of the pension system. The 
data also reveal that the option value increased with age, implying that younger workers 
eligible to retire had weaker incentives to work. This finding is strongly related to an 
observed increase in the wage inequality and skill premia in Slovenia in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s (Orazem and Vodopivec, 1995; 1997). Namely, the option values of 
less educated workers, who tend to start working at an early age and who are thus 
eligible to retire at a lower age, are low because they faced a decrease in real wages and 
at the same time retained a right to relatively high pensions due to a history of high 
wages. 
 In the second part of the analysis, we model the retirement decisions of Slovenian 
workers who were eligible to retire. We find that the option value to work, a key 
explanatory variable in the model, has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
the retirement in sampling of both men and women. This implies that workers with 
higher option value are more likely to continue working. However, Coile and Gruber 
(2001) argue that the variation of wages accounts for a large part of variation in the 
option value across individuals and if wage differences partly capture heterogeneity in 
tastes for work, then building wage variation into the retirement incentive measure can 
lead to biased estimates of responsiveness of retirement to option value. For this reason, 
we also estimate the effect of option value on retirement when entered simultaneously 
with the net wage and find no effect of option value on retirement decisions in our 
sample. An absence of explanatory power of option value alone confirms that pension 
system alone provides weak or no incentives to work. 
 Our empirical model also features additional variables that were used in previous 
empirical analysis, e.g. in Atkinson and Creedy (1996), Blöndal and Scarpetta (1997), 
Lindeboom (1998), Miniaci (1998), Antolin and Scarpetta (1998), Coile and Gruber 
(2001), Gruber and Wise (2004), and Berkel and Borsch-Supan (2004). We found that 
skilled men and highly skilled women were less likely to retire, which suggests that 
better educated workers tend to perform jobs with lower disutility of work. We 
furthermore established that personal wealth, proxied by dummies for land and 
apartment ownership increased the likelihood of retirement. On the other hand, capital 
incomes (rents and dividends) were found as statistically significant drivers of deferred 
retirement for women, while for men the coefficients were significant only in case of 
dividends. 
 The outline of the article is as follows. In Section 2 we give an overview of 
eligibility and pension determination rules in Slovenia. In Section 3 we describe the 
data and discuss the limitations we faced in calculating the forward-looking variables. 
In Section 4 we describe the methodology, estimation method and the results. Section 5 
summarizes the key findings and conclusions. 
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2. Eligibility and Pension Determination Rules in Slovenia 
 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the retirement eligibility rules and 
determination of pensions in the Slovenian pension system. 
 
2.1. Retirement Eligibility Rules 
 
The eligibility rules for retirement in Slovenia were changing throughout the transition 
period with two reforms taking place in 1992 and 1999. In spite of parametric changes, 
the system preserved its key structural feature – multiple pathways to retirement. An 
individual could retire to receive an old-age pension if she or he fulfilled one of the 
three sets of normal statutory conditions. Until 2000 the following sets of conditions, 
adopted in 1992, applied. First, men (women) could retire at 58 (53) years of age and 40 
(35) years of insurance period. These conditions targeted the largest group of workers 
with either primary or secondary education who started to work between 15 and 19 
years of age. The second set of conditions allowed men and women to retire at 63 (58) 
years of age and 20 years of insurance period, while the third set of conditions allowed 
men and women to retire at 65 (63) years of age and 15 years of paid insurance period. 
The latter sets of conditions targeted highly skilled workers, who spent at least some 
time gaining tertiary education, and low skilled workers with lengthier unemployment 
spells.2 
 The 1999 pension reform brought many changes that led to an increase in the 
effective retirement age. The abolition of numerous special provisions allowing early 
retirement was among the key changes. While the standard eligibility conditions for old-
age retirement of men remained unchanged, the new reform imposed stricter conditions 
for women. The first set of conditions allowed women to retire at 58 years of age and 
with 38 years of insurance period. The second set of conditions set the minimum age to 
61 years and the minimum insurance period to 20 years, whereas the last set of 
conditions allowed women to retire at 63 years of age and 15 years of paid insurance 
period. These eligibility rules, however, are introduced gradually and will be fully 
effective yet in 2014. During the transition period the statutory retirement age increases 
stepwise. The statutory age increases by 4 months for each elapsed year from 1999 
onwards, whereas the minimum insurance period increases by 3 months for each 
elapsed year from 2001 onwards.3 
 Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the subsequent effects of the 1999 pension reform for men 
and women. The cumulative shares of retired individuals relative to the total number of 
                                                 
2
 These rules however were not fully applicable until January 1998. Namely, if an individual retired prior 
to 1998 due to bankruptcy of a firm or because of a job deemed technologically obsolete by an employer, 
the minimum retirement age and insurance period could be further reduced. 
3
 Despite the changes, some exceptions to these rules still remain; e.g. the statutory age was reduced for 
all individuals having one or more children or started the pension insurance spell prior to age 18. 
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individuals in a given age cohort declined between 1997 and 2004. In the period 
between 1997 and 2000 the decline was mainly caused by reduction of early retirement 
policies (reflected in lower retirement shares of individuals below the statutory age for 
old-age pensions), whereas in the later period the decline was caused by increases in the 
statutory retirement age. 
 























Source: SORS, TORS, PDIF and own calculations. 
 























Source: SORS, TORS, PDIF and own calculations. 
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2.2. Determination of Pensions 
 
The pensions that old-age retirees receive from the Pension and Disability Insurance 
Fund (PDIF) are determined in two steps. In the first step the maximum pension 
assessment base ( maxpb ), i.e. the average indexed monthly earnings for 120 + n 





















where grosskw  denotes the gross wage, τ  is the average income tax rate
4
, and kι  is the 
national wage index. While expression (1) applied both before and after 1999, the last 
pension reform extended the number of periods over which maxpb  was calculated. Until 
2000 the number of years was limited to 10 and increased by 1 year until 2008, thereby 
decreasing the maxpb  of the majority of individuals retiring after 2000. 
 In the second step we related the pension, pens , to the maximum pension 
assessment base, maxpb : 
 
 max (1 )pens pb s x v= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ , (2) 
 
where s  is the accrual rate, i.e. the percentage share of maxpb  reflecting the length of the 
paid insurance period, x  denoting the rewards and penalties related to longer or shorter 
insurance periods relative to the statutory limits, and v  representing an adjustment 
factor used to equalize the pensions of individuals who retired in different time periods.5 
 The 1999 reform introduced additional changes to the determination of pensions. 
First of all, until 2000 the accrual rate s  was determined in the following way: for 
males with 15 years of paid insurance s  was 35 percent and increased by 2 percentage 
points for each additional year of paid insurance. The percentage share for females was 
calculated differently: for 15 years of paid insurance s  was 40 percent and increased by 
3 percentage points up to 20 years of paid insurance and by 2 percentage points for each 
additional year of paid insurance. From 2000 onwards s increased with paid insurance at 
a slower rate for both genders: 1.5 percentage points of the pension base for each 
additional year over 15 years of insurance instead of 2 percentage points. These 
reductions were introduced gradually. Every year before the year 2000 increased the 
                                                 
4
 Although the marginal tax rates for personal income tax increase with the level of income, the maximum 
pension assessment base is calculated using the average tax rate rather than the actual marginal tax rates. 
5
 This term is called valorisation factor and was introduced in order to adjust pensions of individuals who 
retired in different time periods due to incomplete indexation of pensions during the early 1990s. 
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pension according to old rules and every year after 2000 has contributed according to 
the new rules. 
 Secondly, until 2000 the continuation of work beyond 40 (35) years for men 
(women) of total insurance was not rewarded. In fact, the percentage share of maxpb  that 
an individual could receive was capped at 85 percent. The reform eliminated this cap, so 
that additional year of work now increases the pension by 1.5 percentage points each 
year. 
 In addition, a system of rewards and penalties (also referred to as the bonus-malus 
system), captured in x , was set up for retirement before and after the full retirement age 
and the insurance period. Although prior to 1999 reform modest penalties were in place, 
these were not always used and were only applied temporarily (until the full eligibility 
criteria were met), reducing the pension by 1 percent for each missing year of insurance 
period. The 1999 reform further increased the pension (relative to maxpb ) if a man 
(woman) continued to work beyond 40 (38) years of the insurance period and/or if a 
man (woman) remained employed beyond 63 (61) years of age. In both cases an 
increase in pension is capped; extended insurance period can increase pension by at the 
most 3.6 percent of maxpb , whereas work beyond statutory age can increase pension by 
as much as 7.2 percent of the pension as calculated by the PDIF. Besides rewards, a 
system of penalties was also introduced. For all men (women) who retire before the age 
of 63 (61) without 40 (38) years of insurance coverage, the pension is reduced. The 
reduction is age dependent, capped to a maximum 12 percent of calculated pensions for 
men and 9 percent of calculated pensions for women. 
 Before 2005, the calculated pensions were adjusted proportionally by a weighted 
average of CPI and an average wage, whereas from 2005 onward the adjustment is 
proportional only to increases in the average wage after retirement. 
 
 
3. The Data 
 
In this section, we first briefly describe the data sources and then focus on descriptive 
statistics of basic and forward-looking variables. We also discuss the limitations we 
faced in the calculation of the latter. 
 
3.1 Data Sources and the Sample 
 
For the purpose of econometric modelling of retirement decisions of Slovenian men and 
women, we constructed a panel data set by merging data from three sources. First, the 
PDIF provided us with information on the actual monthly and annual pensions and other 
benefits, the retirement date and the type of pension (old age, family and disability) for 
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each individual that retired in the 1996-2005 period. They also provided information on 
special conditions under which individuals retired6, percentage share of pension in 
maxpb  paid and total insurance period, and percentages of rewards and penalties. 
 The Tax Office of the Republic of Slovenia (TORS) provided information on 
personal incomes retrieved from personal income tax returns. For each individual with 
personal income exceeding the minimum taxable lower limit this dataset contained, 
inter alia, information on labour income (gross wage, annual bonus, other job related 
benefits), capital income (dividends, rents), and income from land ownership. In the 
empirical modelling of retirement decisions, we used data on all these types of labour 
and capital income for the period 1994-2004. 
 The last source of data was the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia 
(SORS). From the Statistical Registry of Labour Force, maintained by SORS, we drew 
information on personal characteristics of employees, such as birth year, gender, 
educational attainment and employment status for the 1994-2004 period. SORS also 
irregularly performs surveys of real estate ownership. In the empirical analysis, we used 
the data from the 2002 wave. Finally, SORS also calculates the mortality tables for the 
Slovenian men and women. In our calculations, we use the average survival rates for 
each age based on the actual data for the 2000-2002 period. 
 After merging the data sets and adjusting our dataset for missing information on 
employment and earnings histories, missing information on personal characteristics and 
labour income of unemployed and self-employed persons, and age restrictions 
consistent with statutory eligibility conditions, our initial sample (“full sample”) 
consisted of data for 34,065 individuals (116,800 person-years), of whom 12,357 were 
men (45,554 person-years) and 21,708 were women (71,246 person-years). 
 In order to avoid biases in estimates, we then reduced the full sample to obtain the 
sample of individuals used in the empirical analysis (“restricted sample”, or just 
“sample”). First, we consider only individuals that retired to receive an old-age pension. 
The individuals who retired with disability pension were omitted from the analysis, 
since we do not have any information on the health status of persons. Similarly, we 
excluded individuals that received family pensions due to omitted information on the 
composition of households. In addition, we excluded from the analysis all the 
individuals that retired under special conditions. These individuals could retire at a 
lower age and with lower total insurance period than required under the normal set of 
rules. 
 Finally, we eliminated the observations for which we detected extraordinary 
dynamics in replacement ratios in time. Thus, the (restricted) sample consisted of data 
for 17,059 individuals (22,084 person-years), of whom 6,702 were men (8,869 person-
                                                 
6
 These special conditions include: workers employed in jobs that were technologically obsolete, workers 
with asbestos, workers in riskier professions, judges, army officers, police officers and other professionals 
with shorter required work span, World War II veterans, and members of parliament. 
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years) and 10,357 were women (13,215 person-years). In order to ensure consistency of 
analysis, while retaining as much information from the data as possible, we ultimately 
limited the estimation period to 1997-2003. 
 
3.2 Basic Descriptive Statistics 
 
Here we give a brief overview of summary statistics used in the empirical modelling of 
retirement decisions of Slovenian men and women. Table 1 shows the hazard rates of 
retirement in our sample in relation to age. In line with evidence for the U.S. (Rust and 
Phelan, 1997; Coile and Gruber, 2001; 2004) and Germany (Berkel and Borsch-Supan, 
2004), we observe the spikes at statutory age limits for normal old-age retirement. 
However, in contrast to the U.S. data where the hazard rates of retirement tend to 
increase with age (cf. Blau, 1994; Coile and Gruber, 2000), we find the opposite pattern 
in Slovenia. In fact, the probability of retirement of eligible men and women aged 58 
and 53, respectively, is around 91 percent, as opposed to around 80 percent for men and 
women aged 61 and 56, respectively. Thus, these patterns of retirement already indicate 
rather weak incentives to work in Slovenia. 
 
Table 1. Sample distribution and hazard rates by age and gender, 1997-2003 
Men Women 
Age Number of persons Hazard rate Age Number of persons Hazard rate 
58 1,691 0.921 53 2,609 0.905 
59 1,462 0.902 54 3,190 0.882 
60 1,169 0.848 55 1,904 0.859 
61 873 0.802 56 1,146 0.788 
62 553 0.769 57 824 0.751 
63 1,228 0.504 58 1,416 0.549 
64 674 0.417 59 958 0.556 
65 479 0.430 60 478 0.494 
66 314 0.408 61 306 0.448 
67 207 0.440 62 187 0.492 
68 134 0.455 63 116 0.397 
69 85 0.447 64 81 0.444 
Source: SORS, TORS, PDIF and own calculations. 
 
 In Table 2, we provide descriptive statistics for the set of variables used as 
explanatory variables in modelling retirement decisions. In the top panel of Table 2, we 
show the averages of age of persons, total insurance period and the number of years 
spent in formal education. The average age of men and women in our sample is 61.8 
and 56.3 years, respectively. Due to ongoing changes in the pension system, the average 
age is increasing in time, although this pattern is less pronounced in our sample as the 
key change affected the statutory rules regarding early retirement. The average total 
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insurance period is 39.6 years for men and 34.9 years for women. The average total 
insurance period increased during 1997-2003 for women by 1 year, while it remained 
unchanged for men, which is consistent with changes in normal statutory conditions. 
The average time spent in formal education (years of schooling) was 13.1 and 11.9 
years for men and women, respectively, with modest changes occurring with time. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics for the sample, 1997-2003 
Variable Men Women 
61.8 56.3 Age (2.8) (2.5) 
39.6 34.9 
Total insurance period (3.2) (3.2) 
13.1 11.9 
Years of schooling (3.7) (3.1) 
15,516 11,242 
Annual net wage and benefits (13,124) (8,941) 
10,326 7,781 
Annual pension entitlement and other benefits (4,443) (3,505) 
0.789 0.766 
Replacement ratio (0.322) (0.252) 
0.642 0.528 
Land income (share) (0.479) (0.499) 
0.844 0.922 
Apartment ownership in 2002 (share) (0.363) (0.268) 
0.042 0.034 
Apartment rent income (share) (0.200) (0.181) 
4,281 3,220 
Apartment rent income (euros) (10,925) (5,979) 
0.383 0.354 
Dividend income (share) (0.486) (0.478) 
1,186 526 
Dividend income (euros) (6,394) (2,532) 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
 
Source: SORS, TORS, PDIF and own calculations. 
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 The middle panel of Table 2 compares the average annual net wage to the average 
annual net pension that an individual would have received had she or he decided to 
retire in a given year7. These variables are expressed in constant prices using the CPI 
with the base year 2003. The average annual net wage (inclusive of benefits) was 
15,516 euros for men and 11,242 euros for women, whereas the average pension 
(inclusive of transfers), was 10,326 for men and 7,781 for women. Both, the average 
real net wage and the average calculated pension increased during 1997-2003 for men 
and women. The average replacement ratio, defined as a ratio between the pension that 
an individual would have received if she or he retired in a given period and net wage, is 
0.789 for men and 0.766 for women. These ratios are relatively high, suggesting that for 
the majority of workers incentives to work, stemming from the expected future wages, 
may not be large. In fact, the average replacement ratios declined with age for both men 
and women (see Table 3), which is consistent with higher hazard rates for younger 
workers (Table 1). 
 
Table 3. Average replacement ratio by age and gender, 1997-2003 
Men Women 
Age Average replacement rate Age Average replacement rate 
58 0.898 53 0.844 
59 0.830 54 0.781 
60 0.807 55 0.761 
61 0.796 56 0.744 
62 0.780 57 0.737 
63 0.753 58 0.723 
64 0.696 59 0.696 
65 0.681 60 0.671 
66 0.697 61 0.664 
67 0.702 62 0.668 
68 0.719 63 0.709 
69 0.711 64 0.701 
 
Source: SORS, TORS, PDIF and own calculations. 
 
 The lower panel of Table 2 provides the average shares of individuals with land and 
apartment ownership and average shares and capital incomes from stock and apartment 
ownership. For measures of wealth, we use indicator variables for land and housing 
ownership. The shares of men and women with land ownership were 64.2 and 52.8 
                                                 
7
 Note that the annual net wage includes the annual bonus and allowance for annual vacation, as these 
may represent a significant part of annual net compensation of employees in Slovenia, while the pensions 
also include additional transfers paid by the PDIF. 
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percent8, whereas 84.4 and 92.2 percent of men and women claimed ownership of at 
least one apartment in a 2002 real-estate ownership survey9. The shares of men and 
women who reported to have received rental income were 4.2 and 3.4 percent, 
respectively, with corresponding average rental income (at constant 2003 prices) around 
4,281 and 3,220 euros. In time, the average share of individuals receiving rents 
increased, while the average amount of rent exhibited no trend variation10. The give-
away privatization of state-owned firms and employee buy-outs at discount prices in the 
mid 1990s also resulted in a relatively high share of individuals receiving dividend 
income; on average, these shares were 38.3 and 35.4 percent, with an average income of 
around 1,186 and 526 euros for men and women, respectively. In time, the shares and 
dividend incomes were declining, pointing to consolidation of ownership that took place 
in Slovenia.11 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics of Forward-looking Variables 
 
Here we document the distributional moments of the forward-looking variables, used as 
explanatory variables in modelling retirement decisions. We first consider the 
distributional features of social security wealth (SSW). We calculated SSW as a 
discounted sum of pensions (inclusive of other transfers paid by the government to 
retired persons) that an individual retiring at the beginning of period t would receive in 
subsequent periods. This sum was discounted using a discount factor β  and weighted 
by the estimated probabilities of survival, Pr[ 1]
a jSur + = , between the retirement age 
and all the remaining ages. The SSW for individual i of age a in period t, itSSW , was 
thus obtained as: 
 
 
Pr[ 1] jit a j it j
j
SSW Sur Pβ+ += = ⋅ ⋅∑ . (3) 
 
 We assumed a constant 3 percent real annual discount rate, and age- and gender-
specific survival probabilities for the period 2000-2002. The real pensions and other 
benefits were assumed to grow at actual growth rates until 2005, and at 1 percent per 
annum afterwards. The pensions were also adjusted by valorisation coefficients used to 
reduce the pensions of newly retired persons. 
                                                 
8
 The personal tax filings contained information on imputed land income. Since these values do not 
correspond to market prices or rents, we only used indicator variable for land ownership. 
9
 Due to give-away privatization of apartments in the early 1990s, the share of privately owned 
apartments in Slovenia is among the highest in the world. 
10
 Due to high tax rates on personal income tax, these figures are likely to be biased downward. 
11
 Gregorič et al. (2010) reported that the value of Herfindahl index for ownership concentration (HH5) 
between 1999 and 2004 increased from 0.199 to 0.344. 
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 In Table 4, we show the distributional moments of SSW by age and gender for our 
(restricted) sample of persons. The age profile of SSW reflects an interplay of three 
factors: (i) deferred retirement decreased SSW due to shorter remaining life span of 
workers; (ii) postponed retirement increased the pension due to higher accrual rate and 
bonuses; and (iii) composition of workers changed in favour of individuals with higher 
wages and higher pensions. We find, although in this restricted sample not in a very 
clear manner, that at lower and medium age the last two effects dominated the first 
effect, while the opposite was true for older persons. Such pattern was not only 
observed in Slovenia, but also in other countries (e.g. Coile and Gruber, 2001, for the 
U.S.). Note also that the pattern of SSW was not globally concave due to composition 
effect at the age limits for eligibility of the second set of statutory rules for retirement. 
 
Table 4. Social security wealth distribution by age and gender, 1997-2003 
Men Women 
Age 10th Median 90th Std Dev Age 10th Median 90th Std Dev 
58 87,702 118,821 226,368 53,173 53 103,596 135,065 197,951 46,242 
59 87,902 125,848 252,601 60,758 54 107,168 152,486 221,083 54,090 
60 88,226 133,859 258,651 63,705 55 110,969 162,124 257,051 63,335 
61 89,005 147,131 266,407 66,559 56 120,090 167,655 289,168 67,782 
62 90,203 162,039 261,808 65,414 57 117,397 173,966 327,753 77,036 
63 56,675 130,214 231,513 65,289 58 69,251 133,226 284,031 82,525 
64 90,485 165,340 234,178 57,572 59 71,638 148,104 295,175 85,042 
65 100,184 173,826 232,352 52,884 60 75,028 179,302 315,463 89,971 
66 107,563 176,060 221,514 46,672 61 72,002 192,063 320,157 93,504 
67 103,993 177,581 225,555 49,210 62 68,336 193,866 317,157 94,185 
68 103,808 183,997 220,872 47,285 63 63,854 171,686 300,475 90,954 
69 76,516 169,856 207,838 52,215 64 74,847 164,969 289,551 85,205 
Note: Social security wealth is calculated in constant (2003) prices. 
Source: SORS, TORS, PDIF and own calculations. 
 
 One of the measures often used to present the incentives in the pension system is 
accrual12. This measure was calculated as the change in SSW between the two 
subsequent periods. Hence, positive values of accrual imply that the pension system 
rewards postponed retirement and vice versa. Table 5 shows the quantiles of 
distributions for accrual. The median values of accrual for men were negative after age 
61, while the values of accrual of the 90th percentile were positive, but relatively low. 
This is an indication of weak incentives for work in the Slovenia’s pension system. For 
                                                 
12
 While peak value, defined as the difference between the maximum expected SSW (over different 
periods of retirement) and the expected SSW of immediate retirement, was shown to be more appropriate 
measure of social security incentives (cf. Coile and Gruber, 2001), the distinction between the two is not 
important in our sample of individuals due to high correlation between the two measures. This was 
expected given the definition of these two variables and features of pension determination in Slovenia. 
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women, both the median values of accrual and the values of the 90th percentile are 
indeed mostly positive, but still relatively low. 
 
Table 5. Accrual distribution by age and gender, 1997-2003 
Men Women 
Age 10th Median 90th Std Dev Age 10th Median 90th Std Dev 
58 –458 586 4,029 2,019 53 797 1,897 3,681 1,632 
59 –117 651 4,607 2,348 54 1,500 3,343 8,453 3,040 
60 165 1,511 7,451 3,525 55 1,304 3,150 9,845 3,903 
61 –576 783 8,072 3,912 56 917 2,596 10,847 4,956 
62 –2,455 –179 6,563 3,841 57 –154 1,730 10,386 5,207 
63 –1,785 –50 7,719 4,024 58 –229 1,275 5,861 3,834 
64 –2,884 –554 7,607 4,399 59 –476 563 9,389 4,793 
65 –2,882 –375 7,914 4,457 60 –1,187 1,067 12,258 5,953 
66 –3,536 –1,256 6,117 3,891 61 –2,614 208 8,785 5,415 
67 –3,252 –1,313 8,429 4,495 62 –1,977 381 7,762 4,339 
68 –4,023 –1,267 9,215 5,125 63 –2,176 –126 8,405 5,219 
69 –3,965 –2,176 3,527 3,550 64 –3,065 637 8,031 4,662 
Note: Accrual is given in constant (2003) prices. 
Source: SORS, TORS, PDIF and own calculations. 
 
 In Table 6, we finally report the option value to work (OV). This summary measure 
reflects the combined effects of incentives in the pension system and labour market 
performance. Option value, tOV , was defined as the difference between the maximum 
expected present value of wages and pensions, and the social security wealth if an 
individual decides to retire immediately: 
 




= − , (4) 
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 As can be seen from Table 6, the option values were positive for both men and 
women of all ages and continued work increased the expected present value of future 
labour and pension income. However, for the majority of individuals in each period, the 
values were relatively low; less than annual labour income. Moreover, given low or 
even negative values of accruals (see Table 5), this finding suggests that incentives for 
continued work were provided only from the expected difference between future wages 
and pensions. 
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Table 6. Option value distribution by age and gender, 1997-2003 
Men Women 
Age 10th Median 90th Std Dev Age 10th Median 90th Std Dev 
58 1,245 6,901 33,866 76,400 53 2,384 7,018 17,988 29,368 
59 2,112 8,462 47,517 85,321 54 2,525 8,612 22,877 36,596 
60 1,848 8,376 57,284 85,955 55 2,291 8,653 22,605 72,470 
61 1,805 8,990 87,638 106,836 56 2,176 8,941 28,100 26,934 
62 1,909 14,346 114,306 136,261 57 2,010 9,059 31,411 27,793 
63 2,096 11,845 58,945 82,770 58 2,255 9,144 29,980 39,320 
64 4,232 17,440 71,584 52,643 59 1,996 9,748 30,392 73,563 
65 4,343 18,231 78,345 59,322 60 2,068 10,311 38,102 62,174 
66 4,255 17,751 71,890 45,718 61 2,708 11,217 40,088 79,665 
67 4,567 15,712 83,300 55,251 62 1,412 10,741 53,137 74,496 
68 3,240 15,298 66,787 52,195 63 1,292 9,066 41,802 62,934 
69 2,896 19,987 76,242 47,165 64 993 12,045 30,997 61,133 
Note: Option value is given in constant (2003) prices. 
Source: SORS, TORS, PDIF and own calculations. 
 
4. Empirical Estimation of Retirement Decisions in Slovenia 
 
In line with the seminal work of Stock and Wise (1990) and subsequent research in the 
field of econometric analysis of retirement decisions, recapitulated in Section 1, as well 
as considering the institutional characteristics of the Slovenian pension system, we 
estimated the following empirical model of retirement decisions: 
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where Rit denotes a binary variable that assumes value 1 if individual i decides to retire 
in period t and 0 if she decides to continue to work and postpone the retirement to the 
future. Explanatory variables include itOV  as the real option value of continuation of 
work, itNW  as the net wage inclusive of other employment-related income, and eD  as 
dummies for different levels of education.13 Variables kx  denote measures of personal 
wealth and income derived from assets. As described above, we namely use dummy 
variables for land and housing ownership, in addition to continuous variables that 
measure income from stock ownership (dividends) and income from renting apartments. 
                                                 
13
 Even though some authors (e.g. Coile and Gruber, 2001) also include SSW as an explanatory variable, 
in case of Slovenia this variable is highly correlated to other monetary variables and its inclusion does not 
provide us with any new insights. Additionally, such a variable can be treated as a quasi-liquid asset and 
is as such less important for decision making (cf. Attanasio and Weber, 2010). 
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In addition to these variables, we also include NACE 1-digit sector dummies, jD , and 
year dummies, sD . Finally, although the variables that measure health status of 
individuals may influence retirement decision, such data are not readily available and 
are thus not a part of our econometric model. 
 In Table 7, we report the correlation coefficients between the crucial variables for 
the econometric analysis of retirement decisions for both the full and the restricted 
sample. Similarly to previous empirical work, we analyze retirement decisions of men 
and women separately; e.g., Berkel and Borsch-Supan (2004) found weaker 
responsiveness to option value of work for women. This pattern is also evident from our 
(restricted) sample, as the correlation coefficient between option value (OV) and the 
retirement dummy (R) is higher for men (–0.13) than for women (–0.08). This would 
suggest that men are more responsive to pension system incentives also in Slovenia. As 
expected, this correlation coefficient is much higher (and statistically significant) in the 
restricted sample. On the other hand, the relationship between the option value and net 
wage is similar for both men and women in both the full and the restricted sample. 
 
Table 7. Correlation coefficients by gender, 1997-2003 
Full sample 
Men Women 
 OV NW R  OV NW R 
OV 1.000   OV 1.000   
NW 0.712* 1.000  NW 0.615* 1.000  
R –0.012* 0.062* 1.000 R –0.050* 0.049* 1.000 
Restricted sample 
Men Women 
 OV NW R  OV NW R 
OV 1.000   OV 1.000   
NW 0.769* 1.000  NW 0.801* 1.000  
R –0.131* –0.210* 1.000 R –0.088* –0.129* 1.000 
Note: Asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
Source: SORS, TORS, PDIF and own calculations. 
 
 We report the results of econometric analysis of retirement decisions of Slovenian 
men and women in Table 8. The estimates of coefficients of our retirement probability 
model, given by expression (6), are obtained by utilising a probit model. In order to 
gauge the relative importance of incentives inherent in the pension system and labour 
market performance, we included variables sequentially while controlling for a set of 
variables that may also affect retirement decision, such as educational attainment, 
measures of wealth, capital income, and year and industry dummies. 
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Table 8. Estimation of the retirement probability model 
Men Women Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.388*** 0.493*** 0.417*** 0.876*** 
Intercept (0.066) (0.070) (0.061) (0.067) 
–0.0130*** –0.001 –0.015*** –0.004 OV (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
 –0.089***  –0.075*** 
NW 
 (0.019)  (0.024) 
–0.188** –0.175** 0.185*** 0.204*** 
High school (0.074) (0.074) (0.044) (0.044) 
–1.028*** –0.954*** –0.399*** –0.345*** College or more (0.072) (0.074) (0.044) (0.048) 
0.060* 0.071** 0.0312 0.035 
Land ownership (0.034) (0.034) (0.026) (0.026) 
0.0853* 0.092** 0.135*** 0.133*** 
Apartment ownership (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.047) 
–0.087** –0.072** –0.286*** –0.243*** 
Dividends (0.035) (0.035) (0.082) (0.083) 
–0.020 –0.018 –0.205** –0.198** 
Rents (0.065) (0.065) (0.093) (0.093) 
N 7,691 7,691 12,146 12,146 
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
logL –4,002 –3,991 –6,387 –6,382 
χ
2
 1,206 1,226 705 714 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
Source: SORS, TORS, PDIF and own calculations. 
 
 In columns (1) and (3), we focus on the responsiveness of retirement to option 
value to work. Given negative correlation coefficients between the retirement dummy 
and OV for both men and women (see Table 7), it is not surprising to find that higher 
OV decreases the probability of retirement. Somewhat surprisingly, we found greater 
response of retirement to OV for women than for men. Namely, the marginal effect of 
an increase in OV by 10,000 euros decreased, ceteris paribus, the probability of 
retirement for men and women with average characteristics by 0.418 and 0.451 
percentage points, respectively14. This would suggest that Slovenian men and women 
                                                 
14
 It is important to note that the average option value to work for men is considerably higher in the 
Slovenian case than the corresponding value for women. Hence the elasticity of retirement probability to 
option value is higher (in absolute terms) for men than for women. 
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respond to financial incentives only very slightly15, and the responsiveness, even though 
of the same direction (sign), is certainly much lower than that found for U.S., Germany 
and many other countries (cf. Gruber and Wise, 2004). This may be a result of the 
design of the Slovenian pension system, where for most individuals the increments 
(improvements) in OV are only marginal. If the responsiveness of individuals to OV is 
non-linear in size, the overall large presence of mainly low incremental OV of 
individuals will result in disproportionally lower sensitivity to OV. 
 As Coile and Gruber (2001) argued, the variation of wages accounts for a large part 
of variation in the option value across individuals, and if wage differences capture 
heterogeneity in tastes for work, then building wage variation into the retirement 
incentive measure can lead to biased estimates of responsiveness of retirement to option 
value. For this reason, we also estimated the effect of option value on retirement when 
entered simultaneously with net wage. 
 From the estimates in columns (2) and (4), we find that higher net wages indeed 
induce both men and women to continue working. However, the implied marginal 
effects, evaluated at the average characteristics of persons, suggest that an increase in 
the net annual wage by 10,000 euros reduces, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of 
retirement by no more than 2.86 and 2.29 percentage points for men and women, 
respectively. Furthermore, looking at this set of results, we find that OV, purged of 
effects of net wage, plays a much lesser role than suggested by columns (1) and (3). In 
fact, the regression coefficient on option value was not statistically significant for either 
men or women in our restricted sample. We thus find no effect of option value on 
retirement decisions. An absence of explanatory power of option value alone again 
suggests that pension system alone provides weak or no incentives to work. 
 Next, we turn to the effects of other explanatory variables included in the empirical 
estimation of retirement decisions (Table 8); we focus on columns (2) and (4) here, 
although conclusions based on results in columns (1) and (3) are the same. Note first 
that the likelihood of retirement is lower for individuals with higher educational 
attainment. This is suggested by negative and highly significant regression coefficients 
for dummy variables for men with high school and college degree (or higher), and for 
women with completed college degree (or higher). The marginal effects of college 
degree were large; the likelihood of retirement of men and women with college degree 
was lower, ceteris paribus, by 31.8 and 11.1 percentage points than for men and women 
with primary school, respectively16. These results can be explained by differences in the 
relative value of leisure between different workers, as the disutility of work may be 
                                                 
15
 Our finding is robust with respect to sample selection; e.g. in the full sample the coefficient of OV for 
women, for whom the response of retirement probability appears to be slightly stronger, amounted to –
0.022, while the corresponding marginal effect amounted to –0.69 percentage points. 
16
 This result is robust with respect to sample selection, though smaller on average in magnitude in less 
restricted samples; e.g. in our ‘full sample’ the marginal effects of college degree amounted to –12.6 and 
–14.2 percentage points for men and women, respectively. 
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greater for workers with lower educational attainment (men and women with primary 
school or less and women with high school or less in our sample) who are more likely to 
hold more physically and less mentally challenging jobs. 
 On the other hand, the stark significance of most dummy variables for education in 
our sample could reflect the bias in calculation of OV, where due to a short pay history 
the OV was underestimated for highly educated workers and overestimated for low 
skilled workers. Another possible explanation for lower likelihood of retirement of 
individuals with higher education is the possible correlation between individual health 
and education, or that one’s health is one of the key determinants of retirement 
behaviour, where individuals of poor health retire earlier (cf. Piekkola, 2004). The 
differences in size of the regression coefficient between males and females, though less 
emphasized in less restricted samples, may also be a consequence of higher 
compression of wages for females, which may lead to smaller differences between 
estimated and actual OV for females with higher educational attainment. 
 Looking at the personal wealth variables, i.e. dummy variables for land ownership 
and apartment ownership, we see that all the coefficients were positive and significant, 
with the exception of the insignificant regression coefficient for land ownership for 
women (see Table 8). Thus, individuals with land and apartment ownership retired 
sooner, compared to individuals without this form of tangible wealth. The likelihood of 
retirement of men and women who owned an apartment was higher, ceteris paribus, by 
3.02 and 4.21 percentage points than for men and women without apartment ownership, 
respectively. The likelihood of retirement of men with land ownership was higher, 
ceteris paribus, by 2.30 percentage points than for men without land ownership. This 
may also reflect farmers, who tend to retire early in Slovenia and run a farm. 
 Finally, by observing the effects of capital income variables, i.e. dividend income 
and rents on retirement decisions of Slovenian men and women, one can establish that 
the coefficients for women were negative and significant, while the coefficients for men 
were statistically significant only in case of dividends (see Table 8). Dividends were 
significant drivers of deferred retirement for both men and women. An increase in 
dividends by 10,000 euros decreased, ceteris paribus, the probability of retirement for 
men and women with average characteristics by 2.30 and 7.40 percentage points, 
respectively. It has to be pointed out that dividends played a different role in Slovenia 
than in established market economies due to give-away privatization of state-owned 
firms and employee buy-outs at discounted prices in the mid 1990s. Both phenomena 
resulted in dividends being paid out instead of and as part of wages, and thus in 
significant correlation with wages. Additionally, high dividends in Slovenia were for the 
most part the result of economic performance in the last decade (before the 2007 
financial crisis), while the pension base was calculated based on longer period. 
 Rents, on the other hand, were a significant determinant of retirement only for 
women; the marginal effect of an increase in rents by 10,000 euros decreased, ceteris 
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paribus, the probability of retirement for women with average characteristics by 6.05 
percentage points. In Slovenia, this negative effect may be attributed to tax 
optimisation. Namely, if a couple lets a house or an apartment, it is cost effective that 
the lower-earning spouse declares the rent income, which was in most cases the 
female.17 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Pension systems are changing due to increased financial burden brought about mainly 
by aging populations. When faced with the task of reforming the pension system, 
countries typically respond by increasing the statutory limits to retire, abolishing early 
retirement incentives and introducing marginal incentives to postpone retirement. The 
key question to address is, however, which of these measures will be the most effective 
in increasing the labour force participation of the elderly, or alternatively, which factors 
are crucial in determining the pension behaviour of individuals. 
 Although several studies tried to tackle this issue, this is one of the first attempts to 
relate the pension system incentives to retirement decisions in a transition country. This 
is especially important due to differences in labour market conditions between transition 
countries and established market economies. This article tries to fill this gap by relating 
the retirement decisions of Slovenian men and women to traditional forward-looking 
variables such as social security wealth and option value to work, current variables such 
as net wage, and variables that proxy personal wealth and capital income. 
 Our analysis showed that both hazard rates of retirement and replacement ratios 
were relatively high in Slovenia and tended to decrease with age, which indicates rather 
weak incentives to work for the majority of workers. The values of accrual were either 
negative or positive, but relatively low, this being another indication of weak incentives 
for work in the Slovenia’s pension system. The option values were indeed positive, but 
for the majority of individuals relatively low; less than annual labour income. Given the 
values of accrual, this finding suggests that incentives for continued work were 
provided from the expected difference between future wages and pensions. 
 The results of the microeconometric estimation of retirement decisions show that, 
although statistically significant, incentives inherent in the Slovenian pension system 
had a relatively weak effect on the probability of retirement. On the other hand, changes 
in net wage had an order of magnitude higher effect on the probability of retirement. 
This could be a consequence of two factors. Firstly, due to high compression of 
pensions most of the volatility in option value was due to wages. Secondly, delaying 
retirement for one year decreased the social security wealth for the majority of 
                                                 
17
 The effects of personal wealth and capital income variables are again robust in sign with respect to 
sample selection, though smaller in magnitude in less restricted samples; e.g. in our ‘full sample’ for men 
the marginal effects of land ownership and apartment ownership amounted to 1.17 and 1.05 percentage 
points, respectively, while the marginal effect of dividends amounted to –2.84 percentage points. 
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individuals. Thus, the key factor that drove some workers to postpone retirement could 
indeed only be the difference between future wages and pensions. Moreover, as 
suggested by Coile and Gruber (2001), if wage differences at least partly reflect 
differences between workers in attitudes towards work (i.e. the disutility to work), the 
financial incentives altogether may play negligible role in explaining retirement 
decisions. 
 Among the set of other variables, educational attainment had the strongest negative 
effect on the probability of retirement; individuals with higher education were less 
likely to retire, which suggests that they tend to perform jobs with lower disutility of 
work. An analogous result was obtained for capital incomes, i.e. rents and dividends; 
they were statistically significant drivers of deferred retirement for women, while for 
men the coefficients were statistically significant only in case of dividends. On the other 
hand, apartment ownership positively affected the probability of retirement for men and 
women. Land ownership had a similar effect, although the impact on the probability of 
retirement was significant for men only. 
 Overall, it is not surprising that among the possible policy measures the parametric 
changes of the Slovenian pension system, targeted at increasing the financial incentives 
for retirement, are not successful in the crucial objective of increasing the labour force 
participation of the elderly. At the end, as suggested by Verbič et al. (2006), the only 
effective policy aimed at increasing the effective retirement age may very well be 
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